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THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
UNDER SIEGE: ASHERMAN v. MEACHUM*
INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
is an essential safeguard of individual rights in the American
legal system.' It was adopted in response to a long history of
oppression of the individual by the state and today remains an
important shield, protecting individuals against abuses of state
authority.2 At the core of the privilege is the notion that the
state may not penalize individuals for refusing to answer po-
tentially incriminating questions.'
The Second Circuit, sitting en banc,4 examined an alleged
957 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc).
The Fifth Amendment provides in relevant part, "[n]o person ... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST.
amend. V. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964);
see also infra note 25.
2 See, e.g., LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH ANENDMENT 431 (1968)
("The framers understood that without fair and regularized procedures to protect
the criminally accused there could be no liberty. They knew that from time imme-
morial the tyrant's first step was to use the criminal law to" crush his opposi-
tion."); Abe Fortas, The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum, Cleve-
land Bar Association, 25 THE JOURNAL 91, 97 (1954) ("[H]istory demonstrates that
the fight for the privilege against self-incrimination was a part, and an important
part, of the great struggle against the oppression of the individual by the church
and state."). See also Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 637 (1896) (Field, J., dis-
senting) (The privilege against self-incrimination is the "result of a long struggle
between opposing forces of the spirit of individual liberty on the one hand and the
state on the other."). For a discussion of the history behind the adoption of the
Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see infra notes 8-23 and accom-
panying text.
' See Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8 (The Fifth Amendment "guarantees ... the right
of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise
of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence.").
' There has been some disagreement over whether the term "in banc" or "en
banc" is correct. See Jon 0. Newman, In Banc Practice in the Second Circuit. The
Virtues of Restraint, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 365, 365 n.1 (1984) [hereinafter The Vir-
tues of Restraint]. Although Judge Newman uses the English version of the
phrase, "in banc," this Comment will use the "equally correct" French term "en
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penalty situation in Asherman v. Meachum.5 The court held
that the privilege against self-incrimination yields in the face
of a relevant government inquiry "under circumstances where
answers might tend to incriminate but are also relevant to the
proper exercise of state authority."6 Specifically, the court ad-
dressed the issue of whether the Commissioner of the Connect-
icut State Department of Corrections had violated the Self-
Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment by terminating
the supervised home release of a sentenced prisoner, Steven M.
Asherman, upon notice by his attorney that he would refuse at
a scheduled psychiatric examination to answer questions about
the crime for which he was charged because of the possibility
that his answers might be used against him in a pending ap-
peal.7
The Asherman court found that the revocation of
Asherman's supervised home release status was not a violation
of the Fifth Amendment because the Commissioner had termi-
nated Asherman's supervised home release due to his refusal
to answer a relevant governmental inquiry, not his invocation
of the privilege against self-incrimination. The court deter-
mined that, under the Fifth Amendment, government agencies
have the authority to take adverse administrative action
against those who invoke their privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and refuse to respond to relevant governmental inquiries
banc." See Jon 0. Newman, In Banc Practice in the Second Circuit, 1984-1988, 55
BROOK. L. REV. 355, 355 n.1 (1989) [hereinafter Second Circuit 1984-1988].
Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure states that an en banc
review "is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered except (1) when consider-
ation by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its deci-
sions, or (2) when the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance."
FED. R. App. P. 35(a). Between 1984 and 1988 the Second Circuit sat en banc an
average of only 1.4 times per year, while the other eleven circuits granted rehear-
ings en banc an average of seven times per year. Second Circuit 1984-1988, supra,
at 356.
Asherman v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc).
6 Asherman, 957 F.2d at 980-81. For purposes of this Comment, the term
"relevant governmental inquiry" refers to any formal or informal civil proceeding
that is conducted by a government agency and is within the scope of that agency's
authority.
' Id. Supervised home release is a type of community release program where-
by prison inmates are allowed to live and work in the community under the close
supervision of corrections officials. Other types of community release programs
include work and educational release, and transfers to half-way houses. See infra
note 38 and accompanying text.
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as long as the adverse action is taken for refusing to answer a
relevant inquiry and not for invoking a constitutional right.
After examining the policies that underlie the Fifth
Amendment and reviewing the Asherman decision, this Com-
ment argues that the majority's interpretation of relevant case
law is flawed and inconsistent with the historically broad judi-
cial interpretation of the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination
Clause. In addition, this Comment argues that case law does
not support the majority's conclusion that the state may take
adverse action against an individual for refusing to answer
questions that are part of a relevant governmental inquiry
without ensuring that potentially incriminating answers will
not be used against that individual in a subsequent criminal
action. Further, this Comment suggests that the en banc
majority's assertion that Asherman's supervised home release
was terminated for his failure to answer a relevant inquiry
and not for invoking his privilege against self-incrimination is
untenable. As the dissent correctly pointed out, this distinction
is without any real meaning because, ultimately, Asherman's
refusal to answer a relevant government inquiry was the direct
result of his invocation of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Finally, this Comment examines the ramifications of the
court's decision and concludes that the decision has the poten-
tial to restrict significantly the scope of protection that the self-
incrimination privilege affords individuals in situations involv-
ing relevant governmental inquiries.
I. THE HISTORY AND POLICIES BEHIND THE PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Legal scholars trace the origins of the privilege against
self-incrimination as far back as the twelfth century.' The
8 ERwIN GRISwOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 2 (1955); 0. JOHN ROGGE,
THE FIRST & THE FIFTH 138 (1960); 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGIORE ON EVIDENCE
§ 2250, at 269-70 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). But see LEVY, supra note 2, at 433
(discussing how the privilege can be traced to ancient Judaic law). For a detailed
discussion of the history of the self-incrimination privilege, see MARK BERGER,
TAKING THE FIFTH 1-23 (1980); LEVY, supra note 2; Edmund M. Morgan, The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1949); R. Carter Pittman,
Note, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimi-
nation in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935).
Although history has often been used as a guide for interpreting constitutional
1993]
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privilege grew out of opposition to the inquisitorial method of
prosecution, which the ecclesiastical courts in England first
introduced.' Under the inquisitorial system, individuals were
required to take the ex officio, oath which mandated truthful
responses to all questions. ° Few procedural safeguards exist-
ed to protect individuals from unfair prosecution. A court could
interrogate an individual on its own motion and then act as
amendments, its value as a guide for interpreting the Self-Incrimination Clause is
not universally supported. See, e.g., BERGER, supra, at 224 ("In its fullest, sense,
the history behind the privilege against self-incrimination is too vast to meaning-
fully assimilate in the process of interpreting the Fifth Amendment."); Henry J.
Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37
U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 678 (1968) ("Although [the] history is absorbing, I do not find
it a vade mecum. The privilege has always been responsive to the needs and prob-
lems of the time."); Robert B. McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy,
1967 SuP. CT. REV. 193, 194 ("History is scarcely more helpful in measuring the
reach of the privilege .... Frequent attempts have been made to uncover abso-
lute answers that by now we should realize are not to be provided even by the
most painstaking research.").
One reason for questioning the interpretive value of the history behind the
privilege against self-incrimination is the concern that the exclusive use of history
as a guide to determine the current scope of the privilege provides for little, if
any, flexibility in the interpretive process. See BERGER, supra, at 224. Such a
static view of the privilege ignores "the absolute necessity of adapting constitution-
al provisions to new realities . . . ." Id. These concerns or any others, however,
should not render history meaningless in a discussion of Fifth Amendment issues.
At the very least, the historical background of the privilege provides support for
its continuation and puts the burden of proof on those who argue for its abolition.
See John T. McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Constitution-
al Affectation, Raison D'Etre and Miscellaneous Implications, 51 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 138, 144 n.31 (1960).
Thus, notwithstanding the differing views of the role history should play in
interpreting the privilege against self-incrimination, a brief summary of the history
behind the adoption of the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause does pro-
vide a useful framework for a discussion of the issues raised in Asherman. Unlike
the majority, which ignored the history of the Self-Incrimination Clause, the dis-
sent properly incorporated the history of the privilege in its opinion, noting that
Asherman could not be reviewed in its proper context without such a discussion.
Asherman, 957 F.2d at 989 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
8 WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2250, at 269-84. Early resistance to the inquisi-
torial method of prosecution was not widespread because of its limited use. Oppo-
sition to the inquisitorial method was generally tied to the struggle between reli-
gious and civil authorities over jurisdictional power and the effort by the Crown to
restrict the inquisitorial procedures employed by ecclesiastical judges. BERGER,
supra note 8, at 8-9.
10 LEVY, supra note 2, at 46-47. One principle difference between the inquisi-
torial and the accusatorial method of prosecution is that under the accusatorial
system, investigators rely on sources other than the accused to develop their case.
See ROGGE, supra note 8, at 139-40.
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accuser, prosecutor, judge and jury." Often rumor or suspi-
cion was sufficient grounds for an inquisitorial proceeding. 2
While the inquisitorial method was initially employed by
the ecclesiastical courts, its use soon spread to the common law
courts." As a result, opposition to the oppressiveness of the
method began to grow." Finally, in 1641 Parliament passed a
bill prohibiting the use of the ex officio oath as an ecclesiastical
procedure in any penal matter. The procedure was later
barred in the common law courts as well.' 6 By the end of the
seventeenth century, the privilege against self-incrimination
was firmly established in England and had been imported to
the American colonies.'
7
Throughout the colonies the general principle that individ-
uals should not be compelled to give evidence against them-
selves emerged as a fundamental right." Puritans, finding
11 BERGER, supra note 8, at 5-6. Berger describes what this meant for the ac-
cused:
The accused was not informed of the charges, his accusers, nor the evi-
dence against him. He was condemned if he refused to take the oath,
condemned if he supplied the sought-after admissions, and risked perjury
if he failed to tell the truth. In the hands of a skillful interrogator, the
inquisitorial proceeding and oath were extremely powerful tools and near-




13 ROGGE, supra note 8, at 146; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2250, at 285.
14 BERGER, supra note 8, at 5-6; ROGGE, supra note 8, at 147.
12 8 WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2250, at 283-84. At the same time, Parliament
abolished the Court of Star Chamber and the Court of High Commission for Eccle-
siastical Causes. Id. Parliament finally addressed the volatile issue of the ex officio
oath largely as a result of the case of a man named "Freeborn John" Lilburn. In
1640, Lilburn was arrested and charged with printing or importing heretical and
seditious books. He refused to take the ex officio oath and give evidence against
himself. For his refusal, he was condemned to be whipped and pilloried. Lilburn
took his case to Parliament. The House of Commons eventually vacated his sen-
tence, labeling it "illegal and against the liberty of the subject." GRISWOLD, supra
note 8, at 3.
11 8 WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2250, at 289.
17 Fortas, supra note 2, at 97. See also LEVY, supra note 2, at 368 (noting that
'as [the Colonies'] political and economic systems matured, their legal systems
most strikingly in the field of criminal procedure, began more and more to resem-
ble that of England"); BERGER, supra note 8, at 20-21 ("Given that the American
colonies were principally settled by British subjects, it should not be surprising to
find that English legal traditions appeared quickly in the colonial experience.").
18 For a discussion of Colonial statutes and pre-revolutionary trials which
adopted the notion that people should not be required to be witnesses against
1993]
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that religious intolerance was as common as it had been in
England, continued their struggle to establish an absolute
right against self-incrimination in the New World.19 Other
social conditions of colonial life also generated increased oppo-
sition to compulsory self-incrimination. For example, the
Crown began using increasingly arbitrary means to administer
justice in the Colonies, and would officials sometimes torture
individuals to extract information during investigations."
After the Revolutionary War, colonial leaders drafted writ-
ten constitutions to ensure the protection of fundamental
rights, many of which included the privilege against self-in-
crimination.2' Later, during the process of ratifying the Feder-
al Constitution, a bill of rights became necessary to allay con-
cerns that the new federal government would become too pow-
erful.22 One of the concerns expressed by colonial leaders was
that, without a privilege against self-incrimination, they could
not insure the protection of individuals from the "the evils that
lurk[ed] in the shadows of a new and untried sovereignty."'
Consequently, when the First Congress met in 1789 to draft
the Bill of Rights, it included the right to remain silent.
In the two hundred years before Asherman v. Meachum,
the Supreme Court expanded the protection that the privilege
against self-incrimination afforded individuals beyond the
limited circumstances from which it originally developed. To-
day the privilege appears in a variety of different contexts.24
Courts and commentators have offered many policies to justify
themselves, see LEVY, supra note 2, at 332-404. But see BERGER, supra note 8, at
21-22, for a discussion of how the notion was ignored by judges during the Salem
witch trials in 1692.
" Pittman, supra note 8, at 775-83.
20 Id.
21 Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, North Carolina, Vermont, Massachusetts
and New Hampshire included self-incrimination clauses in their state constitutions
or bills of rights. ROGGE, supra note 8, at 184-85.
LEVY, supra note 2, at 418-21.
Pittman, supra note 8, at 789.
24 Significantly, the Supreme Court has not found that every setting in which
the privilege is invoked deserves the same level of self-incrimination protection. In
cases like Asherman, however, which involve individuals who have suffered direct
penalties external to the trial process for invoking the right to remain silent, the
Court has provided individuals with substantial protection under the Self-Incrimi-




this expansion. In fact, one reason the policies underlying
the privilege against self-incrimination have received so much
attention is that the modern privilege and the functions it
serves have expanded beyond the privilege's limited historical
scope.2" Thus, some of the original justifications for the privi-
lege are not as strong today as they once were."
One widely accepted policy behind the privilege against
self-incrimination is to prevent individuals from being subject-
ed to the "cruel trilemma of self-accusation, peijury or con-
tempt."" This rationale recognizes that it is "inherently cruel
to make a man an instrument in his own condemnation."29 In
' A comprehensive survey and analysis of the policies underlying the privilege
against self-incrimination are beyond the scope of this Comment. This Comment,
therefore, addresses briefly only the most widely accepted justifications for the
modem privilege. For more in-depth treatments of the policies behind the privilege
against self-incrimination, see BERGER, supra note 8, at 25-44; 8 WIGMORE, supra
note 8, § 2251, at 295-318; David M. Obrien, The Fifth Amendment: Fox Hunters,
Old Women, Hermits and the Burger Court, 54 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 26, 33-54
(1978). See also note 27 for authors who are particularly critical of the policies
underlying the modem privilege.
26 See infra notes 125-59 and accompanying text.
Some commentators have questioned the continued validity of the privilege
against self-incrimination and have argued that it should be abolished or its scope
severely restricted. See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 8; LEIWIS MAYERS, SHALL WE
AMEND THE FIFTH AMIENDMENT (1959); see also David Dolinko, Is There a Ratio-
nale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1063, 1147
(1986) (arguing that the privilege against self-incrimination "can be explained by
specific historical developments, but cannot be justified either functionally or con-
ceptually"). Given the continued broad interpretation of the Self-Incrimination
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, however, it appears that courts have not em-
braced the critics' views.
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (re-
viewing the history and policies underlying the privilege against self-incrimination).
The Supreme Court has recognized that individuals not facing legal compulsion,
i.e., contempt charges, may face choices that "are analogous [to the "cruel
trilemma"] and hence raise similar concerns." Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S.
582, 596 (1990) (footnote omitted); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461
(1966) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination not only protects indi-
viduals from legal compulsion but also from the "informal compulsion exerted by
law enforcement officials during in-custody questioning). Muniz and Miranda sug-
gest that it is not the means used to overcome an individual's will to remain
silent that is central to the "cruel trilemma" rationale, but the element of compul-
sion.
' David Louisell, Criminal Discovery and Self-Incrimination: Roger Traynor
Confronts The Dilemma, 53 CAL. L. REV. 89, 95 (1965); see also GRISWOLD, supra
note 8, at 7 ('[W]e do not make even the hardened criminal sign his own death
warrant, or dig his grave, or pull the lever that springs the trap on which he
stands. We have through the course of history developed a considerable feeling of
1993]
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addition, the privilege plays an important role in preserving
the accusatorial nature of our criminal justice system." Accu-
satorial procedures ensure that the state bears the burden of
establishing guilt and help maintain a "fair state-individual
balance."3' If the government could compel individuals to in-
criminate themselves and then use the information to obtain a
conviction, there would be few mechanisms to limit the
government's power over the administration of the criminal
justice system."
Another policy underlying the privilege against self-incrim-
ination is that it prevents physical and psychological abuse by
government officials. 3 The argument in favor of this policy is
that without the protection that the privilege affords individu-
als, the government would begin to use highly coercive tech-
niques to gain information. 4 Finally, the privilege also re-
flects society's "respect for the inviolability of the human per-
the dignity and intrinsic importance of the individual man. Even the evil man is a
human being."); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 637 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting)
("The essential and inherent cruelty of compelling a man to expose his own guilt
is obvious to every one and needs no illustration. It is plain to every person who
gives the subject a moment's thought.").
" Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55; see also BERGER, supra note 8, at 37 ("The abolition
of the privilege, or its narrow construction by the courts, might thus permit too
much of a flavor of the inquisitorial tradition to engraft itself upon the accusatori-
al framework history has given us.").
" 8 WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2251, at 317; Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55. The Con-
stitution limits the power of the state where the potential for abuse of individual
rights exists. By including the privilege against self-incrimination in the Bill of
Rights, the framers acknowledged that the power to compel individuals to incrimi-
nate themselves created enough potential for abuse that it should be limited. The
result of such a determination was that the state would be required to bear the
burden of proving its case without the help of the defendant. See BERGER, supra
note 8, at 226.
32 See BERGER, supra note 8, at 39-41 (arguing that "[w]ithout [the privilege
against self-incrimination], and in light of the State's extensive investigatory power
and vast array of criminal prohibitions, the result would be a grant of too much
authority to control the individual and too little power to prevent excesses").
"3 Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55; see also LEVY, supra note 2, at 326-27 (acknowl-
edging that the privilege against self-incrimination developed out of the struggle to
eliminate torture as a government practice).
"' See McNaughton, supra note 8, at 143-44. Some commentators assert that in
the absence of a privilege against self-incrimination, the government would abuse
its power by oppressing individuals who hold unpopular religious or political be-
liefs. See Friendly, supra note 8, at 696 (The privilege provides "a shelter against
governmental snooping and oppression concerning religious and political beliefs");
Berger, supra note 8, at 35 ("Compelled self-incrimination, if tolerated, might well
prove to be too tempting a tool for use against minority views.").
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sonality and the right of each individual 'to a private enclave
where he may lead a private life."'
35
It may be true that none of these policy rationales neces-
sarily provides an independent basis for justifying the privilege
against self-incrimination. The strength of any policy, however,
varies depending on the context in which it is offered. Thus,
the strongest justification for the privilege exists when more
than one rationale for the privilege exists to support its appli-
cation in a particular setting.
Both the history and policies underlying the privilege
against self-incrimination are an integral part of a discussion
of the issues raised in Asherman. Indeed, the Second Circuit's
decision threatens the very foundation of the privilege against
self-incrimination by disregarding the policies underlying the
privilege, and viewing the privilege as an obstacle rather than
an important personal right.
II. ASHERMAN V. MEACHUM
A. Facts
In 1980, Steven M. Asherman, a student at Columbia
Medical School, was convicted of manslaughter in the first
degree and sentenced to a prison term of seven to fourteen
years.36  The Connecticut Supreme Court later affirmed
"' Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556,
581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957)). As Mark
Berger observes:
Our system of government represents an attempt at accommodating
the often opposing interests of the citizen and the state. In a very gener-
al sense, it accords high regard to the individual and seeks to protect
him from unwarranted state interference. Beyond that it protects the
individual against methods of intrusion that may violate his individuality
and integrity, even though the intrusion itself may be unwarranted. The
Fifth Amendment very clearly promotes these goals and is justified by
them.
BERGER, supra note 8, at 39. Immunity laws that require individuals to waive
their privacy rights, however, undermine this argument. Friendly, supra note 8, at
689 (citing McKay, supra note 8, at 212).
"' State v. Asherman, 478 A.2d 227 (Conn. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050
(1985). The nature of the crime was particularly brutal. Asherman stabbed the
victim, a medical school classmate of his, over 100 times. Id. Asherman was origi-
nally charged with murder. The jury, however, convicted him of first degree man-
slaughter because of evidence that he committed the homicide under circumstances
1993]
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Asherman's conviction and he began serving his sentence in
March of 1985."7 After Asherman served almost three years,
Larry Meachum, the Commissioner of the Connecticut State
Department of Corrections (the "Commissioner"), granted
Asherman's application for supervised home release ("SHR").
Asherman was then released into a halfway house where he
underwent required drug-abuse and mental health counsel-
ing." Finally, in March of 1988, Asherman formally entered
showing extreme emotional disturbance. The evidence suggested that mind-altering
drugs may have induced the emotional disturbance which led to the crime. For a
detailed discussion of the facts surrounding the crime, see id.
"' Asherman, 478 A.2d at 227. The Connecticut District Court later rejected
Asherman's federal habeas corpus challenge to his conviction. Asherman v.
Meachum, 739 F. Supp. 718 (D. Conn.), affd, 923 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1990).
38 Asherman v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 978, 980 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc); see su-
pra note 7. Asherman's release into the SHR program was authorized by statute.
The relevant provision provided:
If the commissioner of correction deems that the purposes of this section
may thus be more effectively carried out, he may transfer any person
from one correctional institution to another or to any public or private
nonprofit halfway house, group home or mental health facility, or to an
approved community residence with the concurrence of the warden, super-
intendent or person in charge of the facility to which said person is be-
ing transferred. Any inmate so transferred shall remain under the ju-
risdiction of said commissioner. Any inmate transferred to an approved
community residence shall also be subject to specifically prescribed super-
vision by personnel of the department of corrections until his definite or
indeterminate sentence is completed.
CONN. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-100(e) (West 1988). After numerous problems with
the SHR program developed, the legislature began limiting eligibility for the pro-
gram with the intent to phase it out by June 30, 1993. See CONN. REV. STAT.
ANN. §18-100b(a)-(e) (West Supp. 1992). For a discussion of the problems that led
to the termination of the SHR program and proposals for modified conditional
liberty programs, see Brant Houston & Lynne Tuohy, Convicts Using Home Re-
lease as a Way to Freedom; Home Release is Back Door to Freedom for Convicts,
HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 29, 1992, at Al; Lynne Tuohy, After Home Release
Ends, Prisons to Try Again, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 12, 1993, at Cl; Lynne
Touhy, Supervised Home Release Program Allowed to Die; Home Release Prison
Program Allowed to Die, HARTFORD COURANT, July 1, 1993, at B1.
As part of the SHR application process, Asherman signed a document entitled
Community Residence Agreement and Notification which states in relevant part: "I
understand and accept the Community Residence Program as a privilege and
thereby may lose this privilege if and when the Commissioner of Corrections or
his designee deems [sic] appropriate." Community Residence Agreement and Notifi-
cation (July 6, 1987) (on file with author).
"' Asherman v. Meachum, 932 F.2d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 1991). The Commissioner
granted Asherman's application for SHR on the condition that he undergo drug-
abuse and mental-health counseling in addition to the standard conditions for
release under the program. Letter from Lawrence Meachum, Commissioner of
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the SHR program, moved into an apartment with his wife and
began working as a computer systems analyst."
Four months after Asherman entered the SHR program,
the Connecticut Parole Board denied his request for parole.4
Based on this denial, the Commissioner ordered Asherman to
undergo a psychiatric examination to determine whether the
denial of parole adversely affected his mental state and made
him an inappropriate participant in the SHR program.42 On
August 22, 1988, Asherman's attorney wrote to the Commis-
sioner in an effort to clarify the nature of the evaluation pro-
ceeding and to inform him that Asherman had a pending feder-
al habeas corpus challenge to his conviction.43 The letter also
stated that Asherman would appear for the psychiatric evalua-
Corrections, to Steven Asherman (Dec. 7, 1987) (on file with author).
" Asherman, 932 F.2d at 137. To participate in the SHR program Asherman
signed a document entitled Conditions of Community Residence which provided in
relevant part:
1. I will report as directed and follow the instructions of my supervis-
ing officer.
11. Your release on community residence is based upon the CONCLU-
SION of the Commissioner of Correction that there is a reasonable proba-
bility that you will live and remain at liberty without violating the law
and that your release is not incompatible with the welfare of society. In
the event that you engage in conduct in the future which renders this
conclusion no longer valid, then your community residence will be re-
voked or modified accordingly.
Connecticut Department of Correction, Conditions of Community Residence (March
30, 1988) (on file with author).
1 Asherman, 957 F.2d at 980. In making its determination, the Parole Board
cited the seriousness of Asherman's crime, the "reasonably probability" that he
would break the law again, and the belief that his release would not be compati-
ble with the interests of society. Letter from Henry A. Bissonnette, Jr., Assistant
to the Chairman of Connecticut Board of Parole, to Stephen Asherman (July 28,
1988) (on file with author).
42 Asherman, 957 F.2d at 980.
Asherman, 932 F.2d at 139-40; Letter from William L. Tracy, Jr., attorney
for Stephen Asherman, to Lawrence Meachum, Commissioner of Corrections (Au-
gust 22, 1988) [hereinafter Tracy Letter] (on file with author). Asherman sought
federal habeas corpus relief on the grounds that: he was denied his right to cross-
examine witnesses; the jury was given improper instructions; the trial was tainted
by juror misconduct; and his federal due process rights were violated by the appli-
cation of Connecticut's manslaughter statute to his case. Asherman v. Meachum,
739 F. Supp. 718, 720 (D. Conn.), affd, 923 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1990). After
Asherman challenged the revocation of his SHR status, he amended his habeas
corpus petition and pursued only the claim that his federal due process rights
were violated. Asherman, 739 F. Supp. at 720.
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tion, but would not "participate in any interrogation which
[was] related to the crime for which he [was] charged."' Upon
receiving the letter, the Commissioner canceled Asherman's
psychiatric examination.45 When Asherman appeared at the
Department of Corrections on August 24th as ordered, he was
reincarcerated.46 That day he filed a petition for a writ of ha-
beas corpus in Connecticut state court challenging his return
to prison.
The Commissioner concluded that Asherman, through his
attorney, had refused to submit to a psychiatric evaluation and
that such an action was a violation of the conditions of the
SHR program.4" Consequently, he was charged in a disciplin-
ary proceeding with violating the terms of his SHR.49 Upon
reviewing Asherman's case the disciplinary committee found
that he had violated the conditions of his release and recom-
mended that the classification committee review his status in
the SHR program." A short time later, the warden at Hart-
Asherman, 957 F.2d at 980; Tracy Letter, supra note 43.
4 Asherman, 932 F.2d at 146.
4' Asherman, 957 F.2d at 980.
4' Asherman, 932 F.2d at 140
Asherman v. Meachum, 566 A.2d 663, 665-66 (Conn. 1989) (footnote omitted).
According to the Community Residence Violation Report dated August 24, 1988,
Asherman violated conditions 1 and 11 of the Conditions of Community Residence
to which he had agreed in order to participate in the program. See supra note 40.
The Report stated in pertinent part:
NATURE OF VIOLATION
Condition #1: By virtue of a letter received by Commissioner Meachum,
signed by your lawyer, WVilliam L. Tracy, Jr., which indicated that Mr.
Asherman will not participate in any interrogation which is related to
the crime for which he was charged. This is a violation of Condition #1
which states in part, "You are to follow the instructions of his supervis-
ing officer."
Condition #11: Which states in part, "that your release is not incompati-
ble with the welfare of society." Mr. Asherman's community release sta-
tus was reviewed following the Connecticut Board of Parole's decision to
deny parole. By virtue of Mr. Asherman's decision not to cooperate with
a psychological examination, his parole denial, and its possible impact on
him, it was determined that continued supervision in the community was
incompatible with the welfare of society.
Community Residence Violation Report from Jack Tokarz, Parole Officer, Connecti-
cut Department of Corrections (Aug. 24, 1988) [hereinafter Report] (on file with
author).




ford Correctional Center reversed the disciplinary committee's
finding that Asherman had violated the conditions of his SHR,
but upheld its recommendation that Asherman's classification
status be reviewed.51 After reviewing Asherman's case, the
classification committee recommended that he be removed
from the SHR program and incarcerated in a medium or mini-
mum security facility.52 On September 7, 1988, the Commis-
sioner wrote Asherman to notify him officially of his removal
from the SHR program. The Commissioner explained that,
given the recent denial of Asherman's parole application, his
refusal to answer questions compelled the Commissioner to
conclude that Asherman was not suitable for the SHR pro-
gram. He reasoned that Asherman's refusal to participate in
the psychiatric examination denied him the opportunity to
evaluate his continued suitability for the SHR program."
Two months later, the Connecticut Superior Court ruled in
favor of Asherman on his habeas corpus challenge to the revo-
cation of his SHR status.54 The court rejected Asherman's as-
sertion that he had a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in his continued participation in the SHR program and was
entitled to the protections that such a liberty interest entails
under the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution.55
" Id. Unlike disciplinary hearings, which involve misconduct that may lead to
sanctions such as loss of good time credits, reclassification proceedings may be
triggered by changed circumstances that do not involve misconduct on the part of
a person in the SHR program. Ashernan, 566 A.2d at 666 n.4.
52 Asherman, 932 F.2d at 140.
Id. The Commissioner's letter to Asherman states in relevant part:
Your refusal to fully participate in th[e] psychiatric evaluation pre-
cludes me from obtaining information necessary to determine whether the
denial of parole in and of itself had such an impact on you that you no
longer are suitable person for home release status.
The absence of the information referred to . . . above constitutes
sufficient ground for determining that you no longer are a suitable per-
son for home release status. Your conduct in this regard has denied me
the opportunity to obtain information which is essential to my continuing
authority to review your suitability for the privilege of home release. I
am compelled therefore to conclude that you are no longer suitable for
this status and I herewith transfer you to confinement within a correc-
tional facility . ...
Letter from Lawrence Meachum, Commissioner of Corrections, to Steven Asherman
(Sept. 7, 1988) [hereinafter Meachum Letter] (on file with author).
" Memorandum of Decision, Asherman v. Meachum, No. 349828 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Nov. 10, 1988).
" Id. The court found that unlike the revocation of parole or probation, the
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The court did, however, accept his narrower argument that the
specific provisions of the Community Residence Agreement and
Notification and the Conditions of Community Residence,
6 to
which he agreed in order to participate in the SHR program,
created a liberty interest under state law.57 In reviewing the
procedure used to revoke Asherman's SHR status, the court
found that the state did not meet the requirements of due
process because the Commissioner's reasons for revoking
Asherman's SHR were inadequate." The court then ordered
that Asherman be reinstated into the SHR program or released
from custody.59
After the superior court had granted Asherman habeas
corpus relief, the Commissioner ordered another hearing to
determine whether Asherman should be reinstated into the
SHR program and, if so, under what conditions." The prison
warden who conducted the hearing determined that Asherman
should be reinstated into the SHR program under the original
conditions of his release.61 On January 12, 1989, the day
revocation of SHR does not implicate a liberty interest under the Due Process
Clause because a person on supervised home release does not enjoy the same level
of freedom as a parolee or probationer. Id. at 11-15.
See supra notes 38 and 40.
5 The court found that the conditions of release created an expectation that
SHR status would not be revoked unless one of the release conditions was spe-
cifically violated. Asherman, No. 349828, slip op. at 16-21.
" Id. at 27-32. Specifically, the court found that the Commissioner (1) relied
upon a violation of condition #11 of the Conditions of Community Residence with-
out adequate evidence of such a violation, (2) was influenced by public pressure to
reincarcerate Asherman, and (3) this pressure improperly entered into the decision
making process. Id. at 28-29. The court also advised that if the Commissioner
ordered another psychiatric examination to determine Asherman's suitability for
the SHR program, Asherman would be required to answer all questions put to
him by an examining psychiatrist or psychologist. The court emphasized, however,
that any disclosures should be considered privileged communications. Id. at 30-31.
"' Id. at 32. The court also ordered that the Commissioner not conduct any
subsequent hearing because his prior conclusion that Asherman should be returned
to custody rendered him unable to conduct a fair hearing. Id. In the event that a
hearing be held, an "unbiased, neutral and detached person" should conduct it. Id.
" Cross Appeal Brief of Appellee Before In Banc Court at 12, Asherman v.
Meachum, 957 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (No. 90-2530). Before the hearing
in November 1988, a Department of Corrections psychiatrist interviewed Asherman
as part of the process to determine whether he should be reinstated into the SHR
program. In that interview, Asherman's privilege against self-incrimination was not
implicated. The doctor agreed not to question Asherman concerning the 1978 crime
rather than give a promise of confidentiality as the judge in Asherman's state
habeas corpus action had recommended. Id.; see supra note 58 and infra note 162.
" Cross Appeal Brief of Appellee Before In Banc Court at 12, Asherman (No.
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Asherman was scheduled to be released, Connecticut Governor
William O'Neil ordered that Asherman remain in custody.62
Asherman then made a motion to terminate this stay of his
release, which the Connecticut Superior Court granted. The
Connecticut Supreme Court later affirmed the termination of
the stay.63 On May 7, 1989, Asherman was released into the
SHR program. Six months later, however, the Connecticut
Supreme Court reversed the prior decision of the superior
court and found that Asherman had not been reimprisoned in
violation of due process. 4 He returned to prison on December
19, 1989.65
Asherman then renewed his challenge to the termination
of his SHR by filing a federal writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. 6
The court granted summary judgment in Asherman's favor,
holding that although his due process, equal protection and
First Amendment rights were not violated by the termination
of his SHR status, his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination had been violated because his invocation of the
Fifth Amendment had been given as the reason for his removal
from the SHR program.67 The Commissioner appealed the
decision.
B. The Second Circuit Panel Decision
On appeal the Commissioner contended that it was per-
missible for him to have drawn an adverse inference based
90-2530).
CZ Asherman v. Meachum, 932 F.2d 139, 140 (2d Cir. 1991).
Cl Id.
c Asherman v. Meachum, 566 A.2d. 663 (Conn. 1989). The court found that
the letter from Asherman's attorney invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege, see
supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text, was sufficient evidence of unsuitable
conduct to support reinprisonment. Id. at 668.
Asherman, 932 F.2d at 140.
CG Id. The Commissioner moved to dismiss Asherman's habeas corpus petition
on the ground that Asherman had failed to exhaust his state remedies. On June
22, 1990, the district court rejected the Commissioner's motion. Cross Appeal Brief
of Appellee Before In Banc Court at XV, Asherman (No. 90-2530).
" Ruling on Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment at 16-17, 19,
Asherman v. Meachum, No. H 90-007 (D. Conn. Oct. 24, 1990). Because
Asherman's Fifth Amendment rights had been violated, the district court granted
his writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 19.
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upon the letter from Asherman's attorney, and that his deci-
sion to remove Asherman from the SHR program was not pred-
icated solely on Asherman's invocation of the privilege against
self-incrimination." The court began its consideration of the
case by reviewing the general scope of the Fifth Amend-
ment.6 9 First, the court noted that the Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege against self-incrimination is not limited to any particular
type of proceeding, but can be invoked by individuals under
circumstances where answers to official questions might in-
criminate them in future criminal proceedings." Accordingly,
unless the government offers immunity, an individual may not
be compelled to testify under threat of some type of adverse ac-
tion.7 The court also discussed the important policy reasons
for granting immunity for compelled testimony, specifically
noting that "[i]f there was no immunity to protect against
giving such testimony, the government would be in a position
to demand that a witness testify, and the witness would be at
the mercy of what use the government might make of it."
72
6 Asherman, 932 F.2d at 144. The Commissioner asserted that the decision to
reimprison Asherman was also based on other factors including: "(1) an earlier
'shaky' psychiatric evaluation; (2) the disclosure of a drug and psychiatric history;
and (3) a June 6, 1990 report indicating that [Asherman] require[d] long-term
supportive psychotherapy." Id. at 146. The court found these arguments to be
without merit because the Commissioner was aware of Asherman's "shaky" psychi-
atric evaluation when he decided to grant his SHR application in the first place,
and because the Commissioner did not learn of Asherman's drug and psychiatric
history or obtain the June 1990 report until after Asherman had been reimpris-
oned. Id. As a result, these facts could not have been the reason for the
Commissioner's decision to revoke Asherman's SHR status. Id.
The Commissioner also argued that: (1) Asherman failed to exhaust his state
court remedies with respect to his Fifth Amendment privilege; (2) Asherman
waived his right to assert his constitutional argument; and (3) the court erred
when it granted summary judgment in Asherman's favor because genuine issues of
material fact were in dispute. Id. at 141. The court, however, rejected these argu-
ments. Id. at 141.
69 Judge Cardamone authored the panel decision. The other members of the
panel were Chief Judge Oakes and Judge Lombard.
. '0 Asherman v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 978, 981 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (citing
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973)). For a discussion of Turley, see infra
note 152. See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967) ("ITihe availability of the
[Fifth Amendment] privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which
its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and
the exposure which it invites.").
7 Asherman, 932 F.2d at 145 (citing Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801
(1977)). For a discussion of Cunningham, see infra note 153.
72 Asherman, 932 F.2d at 145.
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Further, the court rejected the Commissioner's assertion
that it was permissible to draw an adverse inference from
Asherman's refusal to answer questions concerning the crime
with which he was charged. 3 The court noted that a state
may require potentially incriminating testimony or may draw
an adverse inference from a witness's refusal to testify in a
civil proceeding where the state provides immunity from prose-
cution or where a witness's "silence in and of itself is insuffi-
cient to support an adverse decision [in the civil proceed-
ing]. " ' The court found, however, that the facts surrounding
the revocation of Asherman's SHR did not support a permissi-
ble adverse inference because Asherman had not been offered
immunity and the sole reason Asherman lost his SHR status
was his assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination."5
After determining that the Commissioner could not draw
an adverse inference from Asherman's refusal to answer ques-
tions, the court found that the Commissioner had in fact
3 Id.
" Id. (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1976)). The Asherman
court noted that under those circumstances, an individual does not have to choose
between testifying and risking criminal prosecution, or not testifying and being
penalized for asserting a constitutional privilege. Id. In Baxter, the Supreme Court
found it permissible to draw an adverse inference from an inmate's refusal to
testify at a disciplinary hearing because under state law disciplinary decisions had
to be based on more than just the inmate's silence, the state did not require a
waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege and no criminal proceedings were pend-
ing against the inmate. 425 U.S. at 317-20.
" Asherman, 932 F.2d at 146. The court pointed out that Asherman's assertion
of the privilege was given as the basis for charging him with violating the terms
of his SHR. The disciplinary board then found him guilty of violating the terms of
his SHR. Later the warden reversed that decision and called for a review of
Asherman's classification status. Id. at 140; see supra notes 48-51 and accompa-
nying text. In addition, the Commissioner's September 7, 1988, letter to Asherman
explaining his decision to remove Asherman from the SHR program, see supra
note 53 and accompanying text, stated that because of Asherman's refusal to "fully
participate" in the psychiatric evaluation, he was unable to obtain the information
necessary to determine whether Asherman could remain the SHR program. The
court found that it was the "absence of this information that the commissioner fo-
cus[ed] on as a sufficient basis to reimprison Asherman." Asherman, 932 F.2d at
146. Thus, the court concluded that the sole reason Asherman had lost his SHR
status was his invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination. The fact that
the relationship between Asherman's assertion of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation and his removal from the SHR program was not as direct as in cases
where termination or removal was statutorily mandated did not change the fact




drawn such an adverse inference.76 The court noted that
Asherman was imprisoned when he arrived for the psychiatric
examination because his refusal to answer questions was
deemed a disciplinary violation and that he remained in prison
because his silence was found to be a sufficient basis to reclas-
sify his status.7 Thus, the court found that Asherman was
forced to choose between remaining silent and being reimpris-
oned, or answering questions that might incriminate him and
risking that his testimony would be used against him to pre-
vent the granting of habeas corpus relief or used against him if
his writ of habeas corpus was granted and he was retried.78
Finding that Asherman's exercise of the privilege against self-
incrimination was the "sole basis of the revocation of [his] SHR
status," the court held that Asherman's Fifth Amendment
rights were violated.79 Consequently, the court affirmed the
order of the district court directing that Asherman be reinstat-
ed into the SHR program."0 Subsequently, a rehearing en
banc was ordered."1
C. The Decision of the En Banc Court
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sitting en
banc vacated the panel's opinion." The court held that the
76 Asherman, 932 F.2d at 146.
77 Id.
78 Id.
7 Id. at 146-47.
" Id. In its decision, the court specifically noted that its holding did not open
the door to inmates dictating the rules for undergoing legitimate psychiatric evalu-
ations. Rather, the decision made it impermissible for the Commissioner to draw
an adverse inference from an inmate's silence, unless the inmate had been granted
immunity from future prosecution or the decision to reimprison the inmate was
not based solely on the inmate's silence. Id. at 146. The court also pointed out
that the decision did not prevent the Commissioner from evaluating Asherman's
mental health so long as it is done within constitutional constraints, i.e., without
violating Asherman's Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 147.
See generally supra note 4.
62 Asherman v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 979 (2d. Cir. 1992) (en banc). Two days
before the en banc court issued its decision, the Attorney General of the State of
Connecticut notified the court that Asherman had completed his sentence and was
discharged from prison on February 11, 1992. Id. at 986 n.1. The fact that
Asherman was released from custody before the court issued its decision arguably
rendered the case moot. See Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982) (where
inmates' sentences expired before adjudication of their habeas corpus challenge to
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revocation of Asherman's home release status for his refusal to
answer questions which might tend to incriminate him did not
violate the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.' The court found that states have the authority to ask
questions relevant to the proper exercise of authority and to
take adverse action against those whose refusal to answer
interferes with the exercise of that authority."M
1. The Majority Decision
The court prefaced its analysis by reiterating the funda-
mental principle that individuals cannot be compelled to in-
criminate themselves in any criminal or civil proceeding,
whether it be formal or informal.8 5 Thus, the court noted that
it would have been impermissible compulsion for a court to
order Asherman to answer questions concerning his crime and
to threaten him with contempt if he refused, or to order him to
the constitutionality of parole revocation and reincarceration, the case was moot
because the inmates "had obtained all the relief they sought," Id. at 633, and they
would suffer no "collateral legal consequences.'" Id. at 632 (quoting Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968)); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 147-49 (1975)
(per curiam) (citation omitted) (where inmate was paroled after the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit had upheld his claim against members of the North
Carolina Board of Parole that he was constitutionally entitled to "certain procedur-
al rights in connection with" his parole application, case was rendered moot be-
cause there was "no demonstrated probability" that the inmate would again be
subjected to the jurisdiction of the parole system). Neither the majority nor the
dissent, however, addressed the mootness issue. See infra note 183.
' Id. at 983. For the purpose of resolving the issues in the case, the court
assumed without deciding that: (1) the answers to the questions Asherman had
refused to answer created a risk of self-incrimination; (2) Asherman could bring a
habeas corpus proceeding to challenge the revocation of his SHR status; and (3)
the decision by the Connecticut Supreme Court rejecting Asherman's habeas corpus
challenge to the termination of his SHR status had no res judicata effect on his
pending federal habeas corpus challenge to his conviction. Id. at 981. See infra
note 183.
8 Id. After deciding the Fifth Amendment issue which gave rise to the en banc
rehearing, the court addressed the question of whether all issues presented on
appeal should be decided by the en banc court or whether it was proper to return
any remaining issues to the panel. The court held that an en banc court could
elect to limit issues which it would consider during the course of the en banc
consideration and, thus, could return any remaining issues to the panel for resolu-
tion. Id. at 983-84.
" Id. at 981 (citing Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973)). For a discus-
sion of Turley, see infra note 152.
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waive his self-incrimination privilege.86 The court then exam-
ined a series of United States Supreme Court cases that ad-
dressed the issue of what adverse actions state officials may
take in response to a person's invocation of the privilege
against self-incrimination. The court acknowledged that the
state may not take adverse action against an individual for
invoking the Fifth Amendment if the state's inquiry is not
"reasonably related to the valid exercise of state authority."7
The court asserted, however, that under the Supreme Court's
decisions in Uniformed Sanitation Men Association, Inc. v.
Commissioner of Sanitation8 and Gardner v. Broderick,89 sit-
uations could arise where adverse action taken by the state in
response to a person's refusal to answer a relevant governmen-
tal inquiry would not be a violation of the Fifth Amendment."
Finding Uniformed Sanitation Men and Gardner particu-
larly pertinent to the resolution of the appeal, the court exam-
ined the two cases in detail. Both cases involved municipal
employees who were asked to answer questions regarding
corruption in their agencies." The court asserted that in each
case the Supreme Court distinguished between permissible
questioning and impermissible impairment of a constitutional
right-that is, taking adverse action against an individual in
response to the invocation of the self-incrimination privi-
lege-and found a violation of the Fifth Amendment. The basis
for the violation in both cases was that the government agency
as Asherman, 957 F.2d at 981.
8 Id. (citing Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956)). In
Slochower, an associate professor at Brooklyn College was discharged under a pro-
vision of the City Charter of New York when he refused to testify before a con-
gressional committee investigating "subversive influence in the American Judicial
System." 350 U.S. at 551. The relevant provision of the City Charter provided for
the dismissal of city employees who invoked the privilege against self-incrimination
to avoid answering questions about their official conduct. The Court found that be-
cause the questions asked of the professor were unrelated to his official functions,
he could not be dismissed for invoking his right to remain silent. Id. at 558-59.
The Court did not address the question of whether the City could have fired the
professor if the questions were relevant to his official conduct but his answers
were potentially incriminating.
a8 392 U.S. 280 (1968). For a discussion of this case, see infra note 149 and
accompanying text.
8 392 U.S. 273 (1968). For a discussion of this case, see infra note 148 accom-
panying text.
"Asherman, 957 F.2d at 981.
81 See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
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took adverse action not for a refusal to answer relevant ques-
tions, but rather for the employees' refusal to waive their privi-
lege against self-incrimination or because they were explicitly
told their answers would be used against them in any future
criminal proceeding.92
Based on these cases, the en banc majority found that the
Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides
both "a limit and a grant of power with respect to government
inquiries. " " Specifically, the court determined that public
agencies may neither require a waiver of immunity, nor ask
incriminating questions under a threat to use the answers in a
future criminal proceeding, as was done in Gardner and Uni-
form Sanitation Men.94 At the same time, however, public
agencies may ask questions relevant to their public authority
and take adverse action against individuals whose refusal to
answer questions impedes the governmental process "as long
as the consequence is imposed for failure to answer a relevant
inquiry and not for refusal to give up a constitutional right."95
With regard to Asherman, the court asserted that the
Commissioner had not taken action to impair Asherman's con-
stitutional right against self-incrimination." Under the
court's analysis, the psychiatric exam was relevant to the
Commissioner's public responsibilities and Asherman's refusal
to answer questions about his crime prevented the Commis-
sioner from carrying out a relevant inquiry into Asherman's
mental state. 7 Thus, the court found that the Commissioner
revoked Asherman's SHR status not for his assertion of the
self-incrimination privilege, but because he refused to discuss
the crime for which he was convicted and this refusal inter-
fered with the Commissioner's public responsibilities; that is,
Asherman refused to respond to a relevant governmental in-
quiry.9" Consequently, the court held that the Commissioner's




" The court noted that the Commissioner did not seek a court order compel-
ling Asherman to answer the questions, require him to waive immunity or indicate
to Asherman that his answers could be used against him in future criminal pro-
ceedings. Id. at 983.
9' Id. at 982-83.
, Id. The court found Asherman's refusal to answer questions an "attempt to
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actions did not violate Asherman's Fifth Amendment rights.
2. The Dissent
The dissenting opinion, authored by Judge Cardamone,
warned that the result of the majority's decision threatened
the basic foundation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. 9 In contrast to the majority, the dissent
argued that the Fifth Amendment should not yield to a rele-
vant governmental inquiry because the Self-Incrimination
Clause is a "fundamental limitation on a governmental
agency's ability to conduct such an inquiry."' Further, the
dissent criticized the majority's analysis, remarking that "the
majority greatly disserves judicial precedents construing the
language of the Amendment broadly."'01 Finally, the dissent
asserted that the majority's result ignored "the long history of
cruel punishments inflicted on recalcitrant witnesses that led
to [the adoption of the privilege against self-incrimination] in
our Bill of Rights."0 2
Specifically, the dissent argued that, unless Asherman had
been offered immunity, the Fifth Amendment prohibited him
from being forced to choose between answering questions that
could incriminate him or being penalized for asserting his self-
incrimination privilege.0 3  The Commissioner's letter to
Asherman explaining the revocation of his SHR status"
0 4
demonstrated that the sole reason Asherman lost his SHR
status was his refusal to answer questions relating to his
foreclose all questions about his crime and prevent the commissioner from pursu-
ing a relevant inquiry." Id. at 983.
9 Id. at 985-86. Chief Judge Oakes joined in the dissent. Judge Lumbard filed
an opinion in which he dissented from the majority's opinion to the extent that it
vacated the opinion of the original Second Circuit panel, but agreed with the ma-
jority that the court sitting en banc did not have to resolve every question pre-
sented on appeal and could return any remaining issues to the panel. Id.
"00 Id. at 986. The dissent asserted that this notion is fundamental to constru-
ing the Constitution. Id. at 988.
'o' Id. at 986.
12 Id. For a discussion of the history of the privilege against self-incrimination,
see supra notes 8-25 and accompanying text.
13 Id. (citing Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973) and Minnesota v.
Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429 (1984)). For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes
152 & 156-58 and accompanying text.
o' See Meachum Letter, supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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crime, i.e., his invocation of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation.' According to the dissent, Asherman could be re-
quired to answer a relevant inquiry, but only if his answers
did not involve a risk of self-incrimination. If the relevant
inquiry required answers which created a risk of self-incrimi-
nation, the state would be required to provide adequate immu-
nity to safeguard Asherman against this risk."6 Then, if
Asherman refused to answer questions after a specific grant of
immunity had been provided or he responded to questions and
his answers indicated that he was unsuitable for the SHR
program, his SHR status could be revoked.' 7  Because
Asherman was not offered immunity and his SHR status was
revoked because he asserted his privilege against self incrimi-
nation, however, the dissent found that the Commissioner's
actions were improper and violated the Fifth Amendment.'
Turning to the cases cited by the majority, the dissent
argued that the holdings of Uniform Sanitation Men and
Gardner did not support the majority's interpretation of the
Self-Incrimination Clause.' 9 The dissent noted that the Su-
preme Court has stated that these cases "make clear that a
'state may not impose substantial penalties because a witness
elects to exercise his Fifth Amendment right.""'0 The dissent
accepted the majority's position that existing Fifth Amendment
law preserved the power of public agencies to terminate an
employee for refusing to answer a relevant governmental in-
quiry. It found, however, that such authority exists only when
those inquiries "do not involve an attempt to coerce [individu-
als] to relinquish their constitutional rights,' i.e., answer ques-
tions which might tend to incriminate them.""' Thus, the di-
15 Asherman, 957 F.2d at 986.
I Id. at 989.
'o' Id. at 987. The dissent also noted that the Commissioner would be entitled
to draw an adverse inference from Asherman's refusal to answer questions regard-
ing his crime if his refusal occurred after a grant of immunity or if the decision
to revoke Asherman's SHR status was not based solely on his refusal to answer
questions. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 317-18 (1976). For a discussion
of Baxter, see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
... Asherman, 957 F.2d at 986-87.
10 Id. at 987.
"1 Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434 (1984), in turn quoting
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977)). For a discussion of Murphy,
see infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
111 Id. at 988 (quoting Uniform Sanitation Men Ass'n, Inc. v. Commissioner of
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lemma that Asherman faced-answering questions or losing
his SHR status-was an impermissible choice in violation of
his privilege against self-incrimination.'
In addition, the dissent attacked the majority's assertion
that the Commissioner did not revoke Asherman's SHR status
because he invoked his self-incrimination privilege but rather
because he refused to answer a relevant governmental inquiry,
labeling it a "tortured attempt to disregard the result com-
pelled by this Amendment.""3 The dissent found this distinc-
tion to be meaningless given that Asherman's refusal to an-
swer a relevant inquiry was the direct result of his invocation
of his self-incrimination privilege." Further, the dissent ar-
gued that a construction of the Constitution that allows a rele-
vant governmental inquiry to trump the privilege against self-
incrimination was a reversal of what it termed the fundamen-
tal proposition that "to constitute a proper exercise of state
authority a governmental inquiry must not violate the Consti-
tution." 5
Finally, the dissent examined the history behind the adop-
tion of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
reasoning that the case could "not be reviewed in proper con-
text without considering in some detail the history leading to
[its] adoption."" 6 After reviewing the events that led to the
adoption of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-in-
crimination, the dissent concluded that the "majority opinion
takes a step backwards in the continuing struggle to maintain
this precious right.""7
Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 285 (1968)). For a discussion of Uniform Sanitation Men,
see infra note 149 and accompanying text.
112 Id. at 987.
I" Id. at 988. The dissent found that case law clearly supported a determina-
tion that Asherman's Fifth Amendment privilege had been violated. Thus, it as-
serted that, to avoid the result required under existing Fifth Amendment law, the
majority made the distinction between taking adverse action for failure to answer
a relevant inquiry and for invoking the privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
" Id. In criticizing the distinction created by the majority, the dissent argued
that it was "a distinction without a difference where . . . the two are inextricably
intertwined." Id.
115 Id.
" Id. at 989.




Asherman held that under certain circumstances the Self-
Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment will not safe-
guard an individual's decision to refuse to answer potentially
incriminating questions that are part of a relevant governmen-
tal inquiry.18 The court ruled that a state may take adverse
administrative action against an individual who refuses to
answer such questions, even if the questions might elicit in-
criminating answers that may later be used against that indi-
vidual in a criminal proceeding. In other words, the Second
Circuit, sitting en banc, refused to interpret the privilege
against self-incrimination as a limit on the power of govern-
ment agencies to make a relevant inquiry. Following
Asherman, an individual may be required to answer questions
as part of a relevant governmental inquiry or be penalized for
refusing to do so as long as the government agency labels any
adverse action taken against such an individual as resulting
from a failure to answer a relevant inquiry and not from refus-
ing to give up a constitutional right. The fact that an
individual's refusal might be the direct result of his assertion
of the self-incrimination privilege is now insufficient to invoke
the protection of the Fifth Amendment and shield an individu-
al from adverse administrative action.
A. A Critique of the Asherman Decision
The en banc majority based its analysis on the view that,
under existing Fifth Amendment law, government agencies
have the authority to make inquiries relevant to their public
responsibilities, and to take adverse action against anyone
whose refusal to answer questions interferes with the dis-
charge of those responsibilities." The majority suggested
that the only limit on the power of government agencies to
conduct relevant inquiries is a prohibition against impairing
the privilege against self-incrimination by requiring a waiver
of immunity, asking questions while threatening to use the
answers in later criminal proceedings or compelling testimony
11 See supra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
.. Asherman, 957 F.2d at 982.
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by court order.12 ° From this premise, the majority concluded
that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment
does not bar adverse administrative action for failure to an-
swer a relevant governmental inquiry as long as any adverse
action is imposed for the failure to answer the inquiry and not
for the refusal to give up a constitutional right.121
The majority's analysis, however, is fundamentally flawed.
First, the majority's decision is a departure from the tradition-
ally broad interpretation of the Fifth Amendment.122 The ma-
jority failed to address directly the fundamental question
which, if answered in the affirmative, would give rise to a
violation of the privilege against self-incrimination: whether
Asherman was subject to compulsion within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment. Indeed, the circumstances surrounding
the revocation of Asherman's SHR status compelled the conclu-
sion that he was subject to compulsion in violation of his privi-
lege against self-incrimination.
Second, case law does not support the majority's conclu-
sion that the state may take adverse action against a person
for failure to answer a relevant inquiry under circumstances
where testimony may be incriminating without first providing
immunity.'23 Third, the distinction the majority draws be-
tween taking adverse administrative action for failure to an-
swer a relevant governmental inquiry and for invoking a con-
stitutional right in order to support its holding is based on
circular reasoning. Because the two situations are so interre-
lated, there exists no principled basis upon which to make such
a distinction. Under circumstances where the risk of self-in-
crimination exists and immunity has not been offered, the
failure to answer a relevant inquiry will always be the direct
result of invoking the privilege. 24 The net result of creating
such a distinction is effectively to eviscerate the protection of
the Fifth Amendment in situations involving relevant govern-
mental inquiries. Finally, the majority failed to engage in an
examination of whether its decision undermined the policy
120 Id.
121 Id.
l See infra notes 125-59 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
124 Asherman v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 978, 988 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc)
(Cardamone, J., dissenting); see infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
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objectives of the privilege against self-incrimination.
1. A Departure from the Traditionally Broad
Interpretation of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the
Fifth Amendment
Although the language of the Fifth Amendment's Self-
Incrimination Clause provides only that a person cannot be
compelled to be a witness against himself in any criminal
case,'25 the Supreme Court has interpreted the language of
the privilege broadly.'26 The privilege protects individuals
from being compelled to give any evidence which is "person-
al."27 In addition, its protection encompasses all "testimoni-
al" evidence; i.e., any communication that "explicitly or implic-
itly or impliedly relate[s] a factual assertion or disclose[s] in-
formation."2 ' The privilege also applies to any evidence that
"' See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
... See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967) (The privilege against self-incrimina-
tion "is to be broadly applied and generously implemented in accordance with the
teaching of the history of the privilege and its great office in mankind's battle for
freedom"); Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956) ("[The privilege
against self-incrimination] must not be interpreted in a hostile or niggardly spir-
it."). Some commentators, however, have criticized the Court's broad interpretation
of the privilege against self-incrimination. See supra note 27.
'" Requiring that a disclosure be personal to be protected under the Self-In-
crimination Clause is consistent with the view that it is the defendant's "private
inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought" which the privilege is meant to
protect. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973). Thus, in Couch the
privilege against self-incrimination did not protect tax records in the hands of the
petitioner's accountant. Id.; see supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233-34 (1975) (holding that trial judge's
order that the defense turn over a report by a defense investigator did not violate
the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights because the information in the report
came from persons other than the defendant).
'" Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988). The Fifth Amendment does
not render all incriminating evidence inadmissible, but only that which is testimo-
nial in nature. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 425 (1976). Thus, the privi-
lege against self-incrimination would not prevent the state from compelling the
disclosure of physical or other evidence that does not require the communication of
a fact or belief. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (holding that
the admission of portions of a video tape depicting a drunk driving suspect's com-
pelled responses to police questions that were incriminating because of the slurred
nature of the suspect's speech was not a violation of the Fifth Amendment because
slurred speech is a physical characteristic and, therefore, not testimonial); United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 7 (1973) (holding that a suspect could be compelled
to provide voice recording where it was not used for its "testimonial or commu-
nicative content"); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967) (holding that
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is potentially incriminating. The Court in Hoffman v. United
States"9 interpreted this requirement broadly, finding that a
response need furnish only "a link in the chain of evidence
needed to prosecute the claimant" for it to be deemed incrimi-
nating for purposes of invoking the privilege against self-
incrimination."'
In addition, the privilege not only prohibits the govern-
ment from compelling individuals to testify at their own trial,
but also "privileges [them] not to answer official questions put
to [them] in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or
informal where the answer might incriminate [them] in future
criminal proceedings." 3' Further, its protection does not
cease upon conviction of a crime.'32 Only where the state sup-
plies sufficient immunity can it compel individuals to give
incriminating testimony and then penalize them if they refuse
to testify."3
Under these criteria, Asherman could not have been com-
pelled to answer questions that might tend to incriminate him.
Clearly any of Asherman's responses during the psychiatric
exam would have been self-referential and therefore "person-
al."'34 His answers also would have been testimonial in na-
"[a] mere handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the content of what is written, like
the voice or body itself, is an identifying physical characteristic outside [the] pro-
tection [of the Fifth Amendment]"); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23
(1967) (holding that required participation in a police line-up is not testimonial
and subject to suppression on Fifth Amendment grounds because there is no com-
pulsion to disclose information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966)
(holding that blood sample was admissible because "[it] was neither petitioner's
testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by petition-
er").
1- 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
"0 Id. at 486.
.3 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973). In the criminal context, the
accused may invoke the privilege against self-incrimination from the time he or
she is taken into custody through the trial process. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (accused retains privilege against self-incrimination during
"custodial interrogation"); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (accused
may refuse to testify and the prosecution cannot comment on a defendant's silence
during trial).
1 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984). For a discussion of this
case, see infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
" Turley, 414 U.S. at 84-85. For a discussion of the scope of immunity re-
quired to supplant the privilege against self-incrimination, see infra note 187.
134 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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ture. 5 In addition, because Asherman was not offered immu-
nity and had a pending federal habeas corpus petition chal-
lenging his conviction at the time of the psychiatric examina-
tion, any answers relating to the crime for which he had been
convicted created a risk of self-incrimination.'36 The possibili-
ty existed that Asherman's testimony could be used against
him to prevent the granting of habeas corpus relief or to secure
a new conviction if a writ of habeas corpus were granted and a
new trial ordered.137 Finally, given that the privilege does not
turn on the type of proceeding involved, Asherman had the
right to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination in the
context of a psychiatric examination.'38
Because the Fifth Amendment would have protected
Asherman from being compelled to give testimony that was
potentially incriminating, the question the majority should
have focused on, but did not, was whether Asherman was sub-
ject to compulsion within the meaning of the Fifth Amend-
ment.'39 Where the possibility exists that testimony given in
"~S See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
.. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. The en banc majority, how-
ever, did not decide this issue and instead assumed that Asherman had reasonably
apprehended a risk of self-incrimination sufficient to warrant his assertion of the
privilege. Asherman v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 978, 981 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc).
" Asherman v. Meachum, 932 F.2d 137, 146 (2d Cir. 1991); Asherman, 957
F.2d at 986 (Cardamone, J., dissenting). As Mr. Asherman's counsel noted:
The interrogation was to be conducted under the stressful conditions
where disapproval of demeanor or statement could result in immediate
imprisonment. Discrepancies between statements now and those reported
by police twelve years [earlier] could be used against him. Moreover, any
admission that could be construed as evidence of a shortcoming or prob-
lem prior to the offense pending habeas corpus review might be used
against Mr. Asherman as evidence of extreme emotional disturbance at a
new trial (citation omitted). Unlike a court proceeding where a court
reporter is present, Mr. Asherman's statements would not be transcribed.
He would have no protection against inaccurate or incomplete versions of
his statements.
Cross Appeal Brief of Petitioner-Appellee at 37, Asherman, 932 F.2d at 137 (No.
90-2530).
138 Asherman, 957 F.2d at 986; see supra note 131 and accompanying text; see
also Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (where defendant was required to sub-
mit to a psychiatric examination to determine his competency to stand trial, use of
his statements to the psychiatrist at a later sentencing hearing violated the Fifth
Amendment).
.3 The majority did not address the compulsion issue directly. Instead its anal-
ysis centered on permissible questioning by government agencies and impermissible
impairment of the privilege against self-incrimination. Implicit in this distinction,
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one proceeding may be used to prejudice a person in a subse-
quent criminal proceeding, and choosing to remain silent would
result in some type of direct or indirect sanction, the Supreme
Court has found compulsion in three situations: (1) when a
person testifies at an initial proceeding as a result of imper-
missible pressure by the state;14 (2) when a person asserts
the privilege against self-incrimination and refuses to testify
because the testimony could be used adversely in a later crimi-
nal proceeding and, as a result, suffers a penalty external to
the trial process; and (3) when a state practice indirectly
however, is that compulsion would be present only in those situations where the
court concluded that an action by a government agency impermissibly impaired the
privilege against self-incrimination. The court suggested that only where a court
compelled incriminating answers by court order or where a government agency re-
quired a waiver of immunity or specifically threatened to use answers in a crimi-
nal proceeding would the impairment of the privilege be sufficient to give rise to a
violation of the Fifth Amendment. Although the Supreme Court has found compul-
sion in these situations, it has never specifically limited violations of the Fifth
Amendment to these situations. As the dissent correctly argued, "It cannot be
seriously contended that [these] actions ... are necessary for the finding of a
Fifth Amendment violation." Asherman, 957 F.2d at 987. In support of this conclu-
sion the dissent cited Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984), for the proposi-
tion that all that is required to find a violation of the Fifth Amendment is that
the government agency "sought to induce [an individual] to forgo the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege by threatening to impose economic or other sanctions 'capable of
forcing the self-incrimination which the Amendment forbids.'" Murphy, 465 U.S. at
434 (citing Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977)).
14' Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), illustrates this type of situation.
In Garrity police officers testified at an investigatory hearing after being told that
refusal to answer questions would result in their discharge and loss of pension
rights, and that any incriminating statement made at the hearing would be used
against them in any subsequent criminal prosecution. The Court held that the
statements were coerced and not voluntary and, therefore, improperly admitted
into evidence at a subsequent trial. The Garrity court emphasized that the
petitioner's "option to lose [his] means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-
incrimination is the antithesis of free choice to speak out or remain silent." Id. at
497. Consequently, had the petitioner in Garrity remained silent and then brought
an action after facing adverse consequence for invoking his privilege against self-
incrimination, the Court would likely have reached the same result. The element
that gave rise to the constitutional impairment in Garrity was that the police offi-
cers had to face the choice between incriminating themselves or suffering a penal-
ty for remaining silent, and not which choice the police officers actually made.
Thus, Garrity supports the broader notion that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the
Fifth Amendment prohibits the state from putting individuals in the cruel dilem-
ma of becoming a witnesses against themselves or suffering a penalty for remain-
ing silent.
.4. See infra notes 143-159 and accompanying text. One way to view the penal-
ty situation within the framework of a compulsion analysis is to view a "penalty"
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penalizes a defendant for exercising his right to remain silent
through the normal trial process, and the result is an imper-
nissible burden on the exercise of the Fifth Amendment.
4 2
Asherman falls into the second category. Steven Asherman
invoked his right to refuse to answer questions which might
tend to incriminate him. Upon receiving notice of this refusal,
the Commissioner canceled Asherman's scheduled psychiatric
examination. When Asherman arrived at the appointed time,
he was reincarcerated. His refusal to answer questions led to
his initial reincarceration and formed the basis for charges
that he had violated the conditions of the SHR program. Later
the classification committee viewed his silence as a sufficient
basis to remove him officially from the SHR program. When
the Commissioner wrote to Asherman to explain his removal
from the SHR program, he remarked that it was Asherman's
"refusal to fully participate" in the psychiatric evaluation that
for invoking the Fifth Amendment as "the kind of illicit pressure on a defendant
to become a witness against himself which, if it is effective would 'compel' him to
take the witness stand over his objection." Peter Weston, Order of Proof An
Accused's Right to Control the Time and Sequence of Evidence in His Defense, 66
CAL. L. REV. 935, 942 (1978).
142 The Supreme Court has distinguished between direct and indirect penalties.
Defendants may face indirect penalties involving a choice that impairs their Fifth
Amendment rights during the trial process without the impairment rising to the
level of a violation of the Fifth Amendment. In cases where a state practice indi-
rectly penalizes a defendant through the trial process, a violation of the Fifth
Amendment is not automatic. The Court usually balances the state's interest in
the practice and the threat to the policies underlying the privilege against self-
incrimination. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980) (upholding the
prosecution's impeachment of a defendant with his pre-arrest silence because the
danger of discouraging the exercise of the right to remain silent was outweighed
by the state's interest in justice and truth); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605
(1972) (holding state statute which required a defendant to choose between testify-
ing before introducing any other evidence on his behalf or not testifying at all
impermissibly burdened the exercise of the Fifth Amendment); McGautha v. Cali-
fornia, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (holding that procedure requiring defendants in capital
cases to waive their right to address the court on the issue of punishment in
order to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination at trial did not place an
impermissible burden on the privilege because the pressure the defendants faced
was analogous to the pressure defendants face when choosing whether or not to
testify at trial). But see Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (where the
Court did not employ a balancing test and found a state practice, which forced a
defendant to choose between forfeiting his right to testify in support of an illegal
search and seizure claim and waiving his privilege against self-incrimination at tri-
al, unconstitutional). For a detailed discussion of the Court's balancing process in
these types of cases, see Robert P. Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting
the Adversarial Balance, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1569, 1592-1602 (1986).
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precluded him from obtaining the information necessary to
determine Asherman's continued suitability for the SHR pro-
gram, and that the absence of this information was sufficient
to conclude that he was no longer suitable for the program."'
Thus, ultimately, it was Asherman's refusal to answer ques-
tions which might tend to incriminate him that led to his re-
moval from the SHR program. In other words, Asherman was
directly penalized for asserting his privilege against self-in-
crimination.
The Supreme Court addressed a similar penalty situation
in Spevack v. Klein." In Spevack an attorney was disbarred
for invoking his privilege against self-incrimination and refus-
ing to produce financial documents during a disciplinary pro-
ceeding. The Court held that the disbarment violated the
attorney's Fifth Amendment rights. "' Specifically, the Court
found that "the Fifth Amendment guarantees ... the right of
a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the
unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty...
for such silence. '""'4 In elaborating on what constitutes an im-
permissible penalty, the Court broadly defined one as the
"[i]mposition of any sanction which makes the assertion of the
Fifth Amendment 'costly."" 7 Like the attorney in Spevack,
Asherman's assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination
was very "costly." He lost his SHR status and was
reincarcerated.
The Supreme Court further developed its analysis of pen-
alty situations in Gardner v. Broderick4 ' and Uniform Sani-
" For a discussion of the Asherman facts, see supra notes 36-67. The
Commissioner's assertion that it was a lack of information that compelled his
conclusion that Asherman was unsuitable for the SHR program does not alter the
fact that the reason the Commissioner did not obtain the information in the first
place was because Asherman invoked his right to remain silent. The en banc ma-
jority, however, failed to address this argument.
385 U.S. 511 (1967).
"' Id. at 515-16.
16 Id. at 514 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)). Justice Douglas,
writing for the plurality, found that the threat of disbarment, damage to profes-
sional reputation and loss of income were "powerful forms of compulsion." Id. at
516. Justice Harlan strongly dissented, arguing that the Court should balance the
risk to the privilege against self-incrimination with the importance of the state
interest that the procedure was intended to protect. Id. at 519-20.
147 Id. at 515 (quoting Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965)).
14S 392 U.S. 273 (1968). In Gardner, a New York City patrolman refused to sign
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tation Men Association, Inc. v. Commissioner of Sanitation.4 '
In each case municipal employees summoned to be witnesses
at investigatory proceedings were fired and, thus, subjected to
substantial economic penalties after invoking their right to
remain silent. And in each case, the Court held that dismissal
was an impermissible penalty for asserting the privilege
against self-incrimination.5 ' Importantly, the Court inferred
the compulsion necessary to find a violation of the Fifth
Amendment from the imposition or threat of a penalty for
exercising the right to remain silent.
Although Gardner and Uniform Sanitation Men do not
involve a conditional liberty program like SHR, they do involve
the authority of government agencies to make relevant inqui-
ries under the Fifth Amendment. Like the municipal employ-
ees in Gardner and Uniform Sanitation Men, Asherman was
summoned to answer questions as part of a relevant govern-
mental inquiry and subjected to a substantial penalty for in-
voking his right to remain silent. If the Court found the com-
pulsion necessary for a violation of the Fifth Amendment in
those cases, consistency and logic required the en banc majori-
ty to find the element of compulsion in Asherman's case as the
penalty involved more than an economic sanction. Indeed,
where a person faces the loss of liberty for remaining silent,
courts should be even more sensitive to possible violations of
the self-incrimination privilege. 5'
a waiver of immunity before a grand jury investigating corruption. After an ad-
ministrative hearing, he was fired solely because he refused to waive his self-in-
crimination privilege.
1 392 U.S. 280 (1968). In Uniform Sanitation Men, the New York City Com-
missioner of Investigation summoned 15 sanitation workers to appear and answer
questions as part of an investigation into corruption. Each worker was told that if
he invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, he would be fired. Twelve men
refused to give testimony and were fired. The other three testified but refused to
sign waivers of their privilege against self-incrimination; they, too, were fired.
' Both cases involved a statute which required the dismissal of public employ-
ees who refused to answer questions about their official conduct on self-incrimina-
tion grounds or who refused to waive immunity from future prosecution. See supra
notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
... See Uniform Sanitation Men Assoc., Inc. v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 426
F.2d 619, 626 (2d Cir. 1970) (noting that "there would be sufficient reasons to
support a less stringent requirement with respect to immunity where the issue is
not whether a witness should be put in jail until he answers but whether a public
employee should be dismissed for refusing to give an account of his official con-
duct"). In Fowler v. Vincent, 366 F. Supp. 1224, 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the court
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Two later cases, Lefkowitz v. Turley52 and Lefkowitz v.
Cunningham,53 also compel the conclusion that Asherman's
Fifth Amendment rights were violated. In both cases the Court
found a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination
even though the penalties were of a lesser economic magnitude
than those imposed in Gardner and Uniform Sanitation
Men. 54 The Court did not find the greater magnitude of the
economic consequences in the earlier cases to be a distinguish-
ing factor militating against finding a violation of the Fifth
Amendment. Instead, in holding that it was impermissible to
impose direct penalties for asserting the privilege against self-
incrimination, the Court adopted a broad view of the privilege
against self-incrimination, stating that "the touchstone of the
Fifth Amendment is compulsion and direct economic sanctions
and imprisonment [for refusal to testify after a court order] are
not the only penalties capable of forcing the self-incrimination
which the [Fifth] Amendment forbids."'55 This is significant
because it suggests that revocation of one's status as a partici-
pant in a conditional liberty program such as SHR would be a
penalty sufficient to constitute a violation of the privilege
against self-incrimination.
Indeed, in Minnesota v. Murphy,5 ' a case which dealt
with the privilege against self-incrimination in a conditional
liberty setting, the Court suggested that it would be an imper-
interpreted the language in Uniform Sanitation Men to suggest that "the loss of
liberty presents even stronger compulsion than loss of employment."
152 414 U.S. 70 (1973). In Turley, licensed architects challenged a New York
statute that required state contracts to provide that if a contractor refused to
waive immunity or answer questions when called to testify concerning his state
contracts, any existing contracts with the state could be cancelled and future con-
tracts prohibited for five years. The Court held that the statute was unconstitu-
tional, arguing that the five year penalty was "a substantial economic sanction."
Id. at 82.
1 5 431 U.S. 801 (1977). In Cunningham, under a New York statute, an attor-
ney was removed from his position as an unpaid political party officer and barred
from holding any party or public office for five years because he refused to waive
his privilege against self-incrimination before a special grand jury. The Court em-
phasized that such positions carry "prestige and political influence" and depriving
the attorney of his office would "impinge on his right to participate in private
political associations." Id. at 808-09.
.. The penalties in those cases were the loss of government employment and,
thus, a person's means of support. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
... Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 806.
15. 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
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missible penalty to revoke a convicted defendant's probation
because he invoked the privilege. The Court asserted that
"[tihere is ... a substantial basis in our cases for concluding
that if the State, either expressly or by implication asserts that
invocation of the privilege would lead to the revocation of pro-
bation it would have created a classic penalty situation.""7 In
Murphy, however, the Court held that the state of Minnesota
had not violated the Fifth Amendment because "there [was] no
reasonable basis for concluding that Minnesota attempted to
attach an impermissible penalty to the exercise of the privilege
against self-incrimination." 5 '
Given the Supreme Court's broad view of the types of
penalties that give rise to a violation of the Fifth Amendment,
the Asherman majority's interpretation of the Fifth Amend-
ment is unsupportable. Like the defendants in Spevack,
Gardner, Uniform Sanitation Men, Turley and Cunningham,
Asherman asserted the privilege against self-incrimination and
was subjected to a substantial penalty-the loss of his SHR
status.159 Thus, Asherman faced almost the same choice as
had the defendants in the Supreme Court's penalty cases: he
could become a witness against himself or suffer a penalty for
remaining silent. In addition, unlike the probationer in Mur-
phy, Asherman clearly faced the choice of waiving his privilege
against self-incrimination or losing his SHR status when he
arrived at the scheduled psychiatric examination, and found
that his refusal to answer questions meant his reincarceration.
Given the direct sanction imposed on Asherman for invoking
his right to remain silent, the element of compulsion necessary
17 Id. at 435.
'' Id. at 437. Specifically, the Court found that a probation condition that re-
quired a probationer to answer truthfully questions asked by his probation officer
or risk the possible revocation of his probation did not imply that probation would
be revoked if the probationer invoked his privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at
436. Consequently, the probationer did not have to choose between making incrimi-
nating statements and jeopardizing his probation status by remaining silent. Id.
Accordingly, the court refused to suppress on Fifth Amendment grounds incrimina-
tory statements made by the probationer to his probation officer. Id. at 440.
... Arguably, the penalty imposed on Asherman was not as direct as in Uniform
Sanitation Men, Gardner, Turley and Cunningham, in which the adverse action
taken for invoking the privilege against self-incrimination was statutorily mandat-
ed. Nevertheless, he was directly penalized for invoking his right to remain silent




to find a violation of Asherman's Fifth Amendment rights was
present.
2. A Misinterpretation of Precedent
The en banc majority avoided the conclusion that
Asherman's Fifth Amendment rights were violated by misin-
terpreting relevant Fifth Amendment precedent.16 The ma-
jority asserted that, under the Fifth Amendment, government
agencies have the authority to take adverse administrative
action against a person who fails to answer a relevant inquiry
as long as the sanction is imposed for failure to answer a rele-
vant inquiry and not for refusal to give up a constitutional
right. This view ignores the result compelled under the previ-
ously discussed penalty analysis. It also reflects a fundamental
misunderstanding of the power conferred on government au-
thorities to make inquiries and, thereby, undermines the pro-
tection granted by the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 6 '
Although the Court in Gardner and Uniform Sanitation
Men specifically preserved the right of government agencies to
take adverse action for refusal to answer a relevant inquiry, it
did so within constitutional limits.62 As the Court stated in
160 The dissent also criticized the en bane majority's interpretation of relevant
case law. Asherman v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 978, 986-91 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc);
see supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
'6' See supra notes 125-58 and accompanying text.
1 In Gardner the Court stated:
If appellant, a policeman, had refused to answer questions specifically, di-
rectly and narrowly relating to the performance of his official duties,
without being required to waive his immunity with respect to the use of
his answers or the fruits thereof in a criminal prosecution of himself, the
privilege against self incrimination would not have been a bar to his
dismissal.
392 U.S. at 278 (footnote and citation omitted). This statement supports an inter-
pretation of the Self-Incrimination Clause that permits adverse action against
individuals who invoke the right to remain silent only when they have been given
the benefit of immunity and still refuse to respond to a relevant governmental
inquiry.
Nevertheless even if a court or government agency is not required to offer
immunity in return for compelled testimony when answers are "directly and nar-
rowly" related to a relevant governmental inquiry, the Commissioner's actions were
still improper. Questioning Asherman regarding a 1978 crime in 1988 was not




Petitioners as public employees are entitled, like all other persons,
to the benefit of the Constitution, including the privilege against
self-incrimination. At the same time, petitioners, being public em-
ployees, subject themselves to dismissal if they refuse to account for
their performance of their public trust, after proper proceedings,
which do not involve an attempt to coerce them to relinquish their
constitutional rights."u
Contrary to the majority's position, this statement does not
suggest that people can be forced to choose between testifying
without immunity and losing their jobs.
It would be contrary to the basic tenets of the privilege
against self-incrimination if people could be subject to direct
sanctions for refusing to answer questions that could incrimi-
nate them. Indeed, the Turley Court asserted that only when
employees have been given adequate immunity may the state
"plainly insist that [they] answer questions under oath about
the performance of their job or suffer the loss of employ-
ment.'' " This suggests that adverse action for failure to an-
swer a relevant inquiry would be proper only when there was
no threat of self-incrimination or when immunity had been
granted. This view is supported by the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of its holdings in Gardner and Uniform Sanitation
Men:
[Tihe State must recognize what our cases hold: that answers elicit-
ed upon the threat of the loss of employment are compelled and
inadmissible in evidence. Hence, if answers are to be required in
such circumstances States must offer to the witness whatever immu-
nity is required to supplant the privilege and may not insist that the
employee or contractor waive such immunity.
165
finally submitted to a mental examination to determine his suitability for the SHR
program in November of 1988, a psychiatrist conducted the examination without
questioning him concerning the 1978 offense. See supra note 60. If questioning
Asherman concerning the offense was not necessary to evaluate his mental state
and, thus, his suitability for the SHR program, the case could have been decided
in favor of Asherman on that ground alone. The Supreme Court has held that a
government agency may not penalize individuals for invoking their privilege
against self-incrimination in response to questions that are not reasonably related
to the valid exercise of state authority. Slochower v. Board of Higher Education,
350 U.S. 551 (1956). For a discussion of this case, see supra note 87.
" 392 U.S. at 284-85 (emphasis added).




Thus, the majority's assertion that an individual who has not
been offered immunity nevertheless may be penalized for in-
voking his constitutional right to remain silent is not support-
ed by case law. 6'
3. A Faulty Distinction
In addition to misinterpreting the relevant case law, the
en banc majority's analysis is flawed in still another way. The
dissent correctly noted that the distinction the majority drew
between taking adverse action for failure to answer a relevant
inquiry and invoking a constitutional right is a "distinction
without a difference."'67 The import of this analytical flaw
cannot be overstated. Because Asherman's refusal to answer a
relevant governmental inquiry was the direct result of invok-
ing his right to remain silent, there is no principled basis upon
which to determine whether Asherman's SHR status was re-
voked for his failure to answer a relevant governmental inqui-
ry or for his invocation of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. This is true in every situation where a risk of self-incrimi-
nation exists and immunity has not been offered.
The majority implicitly argues that there is a distinction
between taking adverse action for failure to answer a relevant
inquiry and for invoking a constitutional right by asserting
that only where the government compels testimony by court
order, requires a waiver of immunity or insists that answers
may be used in later criminal proceedings, would the privilege
against self-incrimination be violated.6 ' As the dissent cor-
rectly pointed out, however, those actions are not a prerequi-
site for finding a violation of the Fifth Amendment.'69 The
Fifth Amendment bars a government agency from seeking to
compel testimony under a threat of any type of sanction which
' Indeed, in the context of prison disciplinary hearings, the Supreme Court
held that "if inmates are compelled in those proceedings to furnish testimonial
evidence that might incriminate them in later proceedings, they must be offered
'whatever immunity is required to supplant the privilege' and may not be required
to 'waive such immunity." Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316 (1976) (quoting
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 85 (1973)).
Asherman, 957 F.2d at 988 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 982.
,.. Id. at 987 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
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could force a person to give incriminating testimony."'
Further complicating matters and rendering the en banc
majority's distinction even more untenable is the fact that
Asherman's refusal was limited to questions that related to the
1978 offense for which he was eventually convicted. He did not
refuse to answer all questions, but only those which could elicit
potentially incriminating responses."' Thus, Asherman did
not completely refuse to answer a relevant governmental inqui-
ry, but only those questions that would create a risk of self-
incrimination.' In any event, however, it is impossible to
separate Asherman's refusal to respond to a relevant govern-
mental inquiry from his invocation of his privilege against self-
incrimination.
4. The Policy Objectives Undermined
The policy objectives that underlie the privilege against
self-incrimination are compromised by the majority's view that
the Fifth Amendment yields in the face of a relevant govern-
mental inquiry.' 73 Since the en banc majority did not specifi-
cally limit its discussion to conditional liberty programs and
public safety issues, arguably Asherman could support adverse
action against an individual in any situation involving the
failure to answer a relevant inquiry by a government agency.
Consequently, in the future more individuals could face the
functional equivalent of the "cruel trilemma;" i.e, incriminate
oneself, lie or suffer a penalty for remaining silent."7
In addition, requiring individuals to choose between partic-
ipating in establishing their own guilt and being penalized for
remaining silent is inconsistent with the fundamental notion
that even guilty individuals deserve not to be treated in a way
.7. Id. at 987 (citations omitted).
11 See id. at 988.
.72 In addition, it appears that questioning Asherman regarding the 1978 offense
was not relevant to an inquiry into Asherman's suitability for the SHR program.
See supra notes 60 and 162.
173 The en banc majority did not adequately address policy issues in its deci-
sion, and the dissent gave only cursory treatment to how the decision undermines
the policies underlying the self-incrimination privilege. For a discussion of the
policy objectives of the privilege against self-incrimination, see supra notes 25-35
and accompanying text. See also supra note 27.
" See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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which violates their human dignity.'75 Requiring that a per-
son give incriminating evidence also would not be in keeping
with our society's preference for an accusatorial rather than an
inquisitorial system of justice.176 Wherever possible the state
should have to rely on sources other than the accused to devel-
op its case. This helps to limit the potential for the state to
abuse its power in extracting information helpful to its
case. "'77 Finally, the Fifth Amendment was intended to create
a fair balance between individuals and the government. The
majority's view would afford the government an unfair advan-
tage in gathering evidence in criminal prosecutions.'78 Thus,
Asherman is a case that lies at the heart of the privilege
against self-incrimination. By failing to examine its underlying
policies, the Asherman court ignored an important part of any
Fifth Amendment analysis.
B. Ramifications of Asherman
The en banc majority's decision went beyond a discussion
of the conditional liberty programs and public safety issues
that would have been necessary to decide the case. The
majority's analysis focused on the power of government agen-
cies to conduct inquiries "where the answers might tend to
incriminate but are also relevant to the proper exercise of state
authority."'79 Thus, Asherman could have consequences far
beyond correctional systems.
The majority found that the Supreme Court preserved the
authority of public agencies to take adverse action against an
individual for refusing to answer a relevant government inqui-
ry even if the answers might be incriminating. 8 ' According
to the majority, the only limit to this power is that a govern-
ment agency cannot take adverse action for invoking the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. On its face this limit would
seem to provide broad Fifth Amendment protection. The en
banc majority, however, by creating a constitutionally signifi-
175 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
176 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
17 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
' Asherman v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 978, 980-81 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc).
"0 Id. at 982-83.
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cant distinction between taking adverse action for refusal to
answer a relevant inquiry and taking adverse action for invok-
ing a constitutional right, substantially limited the protection
of the self-incrimination privilege.
After Asherman, any government agency making an inqui-
ry that is relevant to its public responsibilities could argue
that it took adverse action for the refusal to answer a relevant
inquiry and not for invoking the self-incrimination privilege.
All local, state and federal government agencies that regularly
engage in fact finding investigations which raise the specter of
future criminal charges could use Asherman as a shield for
adverse administrative action against those individuals who
refuse to incriminate themselves. Unless the penalty that a
person suffered was as direct and automatic as those in
Gardner, Uniform Sanitation Men, Turley and Cunningham, it
would be difficult to establish a violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment-even if a person's refusal to answer a relevant govern-
ment inquiry was the direct result of his or her invocation of
the Fifth Amendment.
This is not the only impact that the Asherman decision
will likely have. Incriminating testimony given during an in-
quiry which is also relevant to the legitimate exercise of gov-
ernment power will now be admissible in a subsequent crimi-
nal proceeding unless a person can establish that the govern-
ment compelled the testimony.'' Proving compulsion after
Asherman, however, will be quite difficult. The court seemed to
suggest that only where a government agency seeks a court
order compelling answers, requires a waiver of the privilege or
insists that answers can be used in a future criminal proceed-
ing will the impairment of the Fifth Amendment be sufficient
to find a violation."2 Such flagrant violations of the Fifth
Amendment, however, will rarely be the case. This is signifi-
cant because individuals will not be able to suppress testimony
successfully if they would not have been protected by the Fifth
Amendment had they chosen to remain silent. Also, once a
person testifies, there is a risk that the state will argue that
the person waived the self-incrimination privilege. If the state
can prove that the statements were voluntary, the testimony
... See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); supra note 140.
" Asherman, 957 F.2d at 983.
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would certainly be admissible. Thus, not only does the
Asherman decision limit the scope of Fifth Amendment protec-
tion to any situation involving a relevant inquiry by a govern-
ment agency, but it does so quite significantly.
18 3
C. A Better Approach
The dissent's broad interpretation of the Self-Incrimination
Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides a better framework
for viewing possible Fifth Amendment violations. Basic to the
notion that individuals should not be compelled to be witnesses
against themselves is that individuals should not face a penal-
ty external to the trial process for invoking their privilege
against self-incrimination." The dissent's view would pro-
hibit any direct sanction for invoking the right to remain si-
lent.
Under the dissent's interpretation of relevant case law, a
government agency could exact a penalty on someone for refus-
ing to answer a relevant inquiry in a situation where no risk of
self-incrimination existed. Adverse action could also be taken
when an individual who exchanges his privilege for a grant of
adequate immunity refuses to answer a relevant governmental
inquiry. However, where a person's refusal to answer questions
is based on the legitimate invocation of the privilege against
self-incrimination and the government does not confer proper
immunity, adverse action would be impermissible.'85 This in-
terpretation of the Fifth Amendment would not foreclose gov-
ernment agencies from making relevant inquiries.'86 If the
risk of self-incrimination bars individuals from providing im-
portant information, the state can remove the impediment by a
grant of immunity."'
'" Another particularly disturbing aspect of Asherman is the en banc majority's
apparent eagerness to render a decision hostile to the Fifth Amendment. The en
banc majority issued its decision after Asherman had finished serving his sentence
and, thus, the Fifth Amendment issue was arguably moot. See supra note 82. In
addition, in order to render its decision the en banc majority assumed without
deciding several significant issues. See supra note 83.
184 See supra notes 140-59 and accompanying text.
18 Asherman, 957 F.2d at 986-87 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
'8 See supra note 80.
' The Supreme Court has held that "use immunity" is sufficient to supplant
the privilege against self-incrimination. "Use immunity" prevents the admission in
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Although the result reached by the dissent is preferable to
that of the majority because it minimizes infringement on Fifth
Amendment rights, it does raise several arguments which
must be addressed in order to defend successfully a broad view
of the Fifth Amendment in cases involving relevant govern-
mental inquiries. With regard to cases involving conditional
liberty programs such as SHR, a rule that the Fifth Amend-
ment limits the ability of government agencies to conduct rele-
vant inquiries could delay or prevent corrections officials from
obtaining information critical to determining an inmate's suit-
ability for SHR or other related programs. As a result, inmates
might remain in programs for which they are not suitable and
pose a danger to society.
This argument, however, is not persuasive. First, most
cases do not reach the trial stage. Therefore most prisoners
have pleaded guilty and, thus, have no Fifth Amendment privi-
lege.18 Other prisoners will not have pursued appeals. Still
a criminal trial of any testimony which a person was compelled to give in a prior
proceeding. This type of immunity prevents the admission of evidence derived from
compelled testimony. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). States, how-
ever, retain the right to require a broader form of immunity under state constitu-
tional law. Currently five states have declined to follow Kastigar, finding that the
privilege against self-incrimination in their state constitution requires "transaction-
al immunity," which accords witnesses complete immunity from prosecution for the
offense related to the compelled testimony. See State v. Gonzalez, 825 P.2d 920,
934, affd, 853 P.2d 526 (Alaska 1993) (noting that use and derivative use immuni-
ty are impractical and problematic); State v. Miyasaki, 614 P.2d 915, 923 (Haw.
1980) (noting that use and derivative use immunity fail to place a witness in the
same position as if never testifying); Attorney General v. Colleton, 444 N.E.2d 915,
921 (Mass. 1982) (stating that only transaction immunity sufficiently protects an
individual from self-incrimination); Wright v. McAdory, 536 So. 2d 897, 903 (Miss.
1988) (expressing concern that use and derivative use immunity allow information
gained from the immunized testimony); State v. Soriano, 684 P.2d. 1220, 1223,
aff'd, 693 P.2d 26 (Or. 1984) (stating that use and derivative use immunity fail to
prohibit-non-evidentiary use of testimony). In these states or ztates which have
statutory provisions which provide for "transactional immunity" under certain cir-
cumstances, this "transactional immunity" would not affect the pending appeals of
individuals and would require dismissal of charges only if the case was reversed
on appeal. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 349 (1967) (finding that trans-
actional immunity was meant to afford adequate protection from future prosecution
not to immunize individuals from punishment pursuant to prior prosecutions);
Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507, 512-14 (1960) (finding that immunity stat-
utes need not do more than protect a witness from future prosecutions).
" Cross Appeal Brief of Appellee Before In Banc Court at 47, Asherman v.
Meachum, 957 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (No. 90-2530). This is true only
for those whose conduct while in prison or under the supervision of corrections
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others will have voluntarily admitted guilt. Consequently, only
a small percentage of prisoners will be afforded protection
under the Fifth Amendment."9 Moreover, in those rare situa-
tions in which an inmate-defendant could legitimately invoke
the privilege against self-incrimination, an assurance by prison
officials that any statements made will not be used in a subse-
quent criminal proceeding if a new trial is granted would be
sufficient. 9 '
Under these circumstances, a grant of immunity would
encourage inmates to participate freely in the examination. In
the end, this would benefit society and the participants in SHR
and other related programs. Corrections officials would be able
to obtain the information necessary to determine whether
certain individuals are a threat to society if they remain in
conditional liberty programs. Participants in SHR and other
related programs would not face self-incrimination pressures
and could receive necessary treatment and counseling.
A rule requiring that corrections officials confer immunity
on individuals whose statements could be used against them in
subsequent criminal proceedings would not create an undue
burden on the state. Indeed, no special procedural mechanism
for granting immunity would have to be created.'9 ' This un-
officers has been without incident. Situations in which an inmate, parolee or
probationer's conduct has led to revocation or disciplinary proceedings and the
possibility exists that criminal charges will be filed in the future give rise to new
Fifth Amendment issues. See, e.g., Joseph Doyle, The Due Process Need for Post-
ponement on Use Immunity in Probation Revocation Hearing Based on Criminal
Charges, 68 MINN. L. REv. 1077 (1984); William R. Stein, Resolving Tensions Be-
tween Constitutional Rights: Use Immunity in Concurrent or Related Proceedings,
76 COLUM. L. REV. 674 (1976); Note, Revocation of Conditional Liberty for the
Commission of a Crime: Double Jeopardy and Self-Incrimination, 74 MICH. L. REV.
525 (1976).
"' Id.; Cross Appeal Brief for Appellee Before In Banc Court at 47, Asherman
(No. 90-2530).
"' See id. at 48. It is important to note that the Supreme Court has stated
that a prisoner "may rightfully refuse to answer questions unless and until he is
protected against the use of his compelled answers and the evidence derived there-
from .. . ." Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v.
Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973)).
... The Fifth Amendment requires immunity when testimony is compelled. See
Garrity v. New Jersey, 71 U.S. 493 (1967); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y.
Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964). Thus, immunity can be conferred even in the ab-
sence of a statute. The Second Circuit in Uniform Sanitation Men adopted this
view, stating "we see no reason why there must be a statute conferring [use im-
munity]." Uniform Sanitation Men Assoc., Inc. v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 426
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dermines the argument that government inquiries might be de-
layed in situations in which immunity is required.192 In addi-
tion, a grant of immunity would not preclude prosecuting a
person who gave immunized testimony. "Use immunity" would
only prevent the state from any direct or indirect reliance on
immunized testimony. 193 The state would be required to
prove an independent basis for all its evidence in any subse-
quent proceeding.' This does nothing more than put the
state in the same position in which it would have been had the
person not testified.'95
Of course, if testimony is highly probative, exclusion of
such evidence in a later proceeding may threaten the fact find-
ing process. Where evidence sufficiently threatens a constitu-
tional right, however, courts will exclude it in order to preserve
constitutional protections. For example, when evidence is ob-
tained through an illegal search and seizure in violation of the
F.2d 619, 626 (2d Cir. 1970).
One could argue that a specific grant of immunity is not necessary because
compelled statements would not be admissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding.
Garrity, 385 U.S. 493. This argument, however, is unavailing. First, if such an
argument had any credence, there would be no need for government officials to
confer immunity upon individuals under statute or otherwise. Second, it would be
patently unfair to require individuals to risk self-incrimination based on the possi-
bility that these statements would be inadmissible at a later criminal proceeding.
As the Second Circuit panel correctly noted, "[tihe witness' future would be left to
mere chance-like hazarding everything on a throw of the dice-a risk so totally
unacceptable as to account for the existence of the salutary immunity rule for
compelled testimony." Asherman v. Meachum, 932 F.2d 137, 145 (2d Cir. 1991),
opinion vacated, 957 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc).
" See Fowler v. Vincent, 366 F. Supp. 1224, 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (noting that
requiring prisoners who face intramural disciplinary hearings and possible criminal
prosecution be informed by corrections officials that they have use immunity "fully
protects the prisoner's right against self-incrimination and yet permits the prison
disciplinary system to retain a speed and flexibility which should not be encum-
bered by excessive procedural formality").
..3 See supra note 187.
" Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972); see also United States
v. North, 920 F.2d 940, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (holding that Kastigar is
violated "whenever the prosecution puts on a witness when testimony is shaped,
directly or indirectly, by compelled testimony, regardless of how or by whom he
was exposed to that compelled testimony"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2235 (1991).
.5 One argument against "use immunity" concerns situations in which a person
confesses and then is acquitted in a subsequent proceeding because the prosecution
lacks independent evidence and is not able to introduce prior statements. This
argument, however, is not applicable in situations like Asherman's where the pros-
ecution already had sufficient evidence for a conviction at an earlier trial.
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Fourth Amendment, it is inadmissible at trial. 9 6 Also while
in police custody, the confessions and incriminating admissions
of individuals are not admissible in evidence unless given vol-
untarily'97 and obtained after notification of the right to
counsel and the right to remain silent. 9 ' In these situations,
the preservation of constitutional protections outweigh the
state's interest in convicting the guilty. In addition, the fact
that the state has a legitimate interest in conducting an inqui-
ry is not sufficient, in and of itself, to override the protection
that the privilege against self-incrimination affords. In direct
penalty cases, the Court has "rejected the notion that citizens
may be forced to incriminate themselves because it serves a
governmental need."'99
A rule requiring immunity would also reduce court costs.
Given immunity, individuals would be free to respond to a
relevant governmental inquiry without concern that their testi-
mony could be used against them in a later criminal proceed-
ing. Consequently, there would be no need to bring separate
Fifth Amendment claims to suppress evidence at a subsequent
trial. Where a government agency offered immunity, there
would be no legal justification for remaining silent and thus
fewer situations in which a government agency could impose a
penalty for remaining silent.
CONCLUSION
The Fifth Amendment does not prevent a defendant from
having to make difficult choices involving the privilege against
self-incrimination during the trial process. In cases like
Asherman, however, where the invocation of the privilege
" See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that where a suspect is
arrested and shows at a suppression hearing that the evidence was obtained
through a search that violated the Fourth Amendment, such evidence will not be
admissible at trial in either state or federal court).
"9 Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) (holding that confession ob-
tained by police was the end product of coercive influences and, therefore, constitu-
tionally inadmissible as evidence).
' ' Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
199 Leftkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 808 (1977)s see also Leftkowitz v.
Turley, 419 U.S. 70, 78-79 (1973) (noting that "claims of overriding [state) inter-




against self-incrimination takes place outside the trial process,
the penalties individuals may face for invoking the privilege
are of a very different nature than the indirect penalties a
defendant may face during trial. The right to remain silent of
those who face direct penalties is not only impaired by
Asherman, it is all but eviscerated because they face an end
result that will always be adverse to their interests.
The result in Asherman is not supported by judicial prece-
dent, which has construed the language of the Fifth Amend-
ment broadly. Furthermore, the majority's distinction between
taking adverse action for failure to answer a relevant govern-
mental inquiry and for invoking a constitutional right is unten-
able. The effect of Asherman is to restrict significantly the
privilege against self-incrimination in situations involving not
only inquiries by corrections officials, but potentially and by
logical extension, all government agencies. This will force more
people to face the exact dilemma that the Fifth Amendment is
intended to prevent-providing the government with incrimi-
nating testimony that can be used in a later criminal proceed-
ing or being sanctioned for remaining silent. To avoid this
result, some form of immunity should be provided in situations
in which answers to a relevant governmental inquiry may tend
to incriminate but are also relevant to the valid exercise of
government authority. The privilege against self-incrimination
must be preserved even in the face of a relevant governmental
inquiry.
Mary A. Shein
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